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(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.
- Article 1:201 of the Principles of European Contract Law.

Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.
- Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
. . . [Tlhe obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree
ment but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
- Section 1-102(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Both the Principles of European Contract Law ("PECL"),
recently issued in revised and more complete form by the Com
mission of European Contract Law (chaired by Professor Ole
Lando),! and the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), a compen
dium of commercial laws widely adopted by U.S. states and ter
ritories,2 impose upon parties to contracts a general obligation
of good faith. 3 The UCC good faith obligation has been an im
portant - at any rate, oft cited 4 - element ofthe Code's jurispru
1 THE COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW [hereinafter "the Commis
sion" or "the Lando Commission"], PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS
I AND II COMBINED AND REVISED [hereinafter PECL] (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.
2000).
2 References to the VCC in this article will be to the 2000 official version.
3 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, and VCC §§ 1-203 & 1-102(3), quoted in
the headnote to this article. Both the PECL and the VCC impose other specific
good faith obligations in connection with particular rights, obligations or rules.
See, e.g., PECL art. 4:109(2) (permitting a court to adapt an unconscionable con
tract "to bring it into accordance with what might have been agreed had the re
quirements of good faith and fair dealing been followed"; VCC § 2-305(2)
(specifying that in output and requirement contracts the quantity of goods ten
dered or demanded must be "such actual output or requirements as may occur in
good faith.") To keep the present article within reasonable bounds, my observa
tions are limited to the general good faith provisions of the PECL (art. 1:201) and
the VCC (§ 1-203), except where otherwise specifically indicated.
4 The Uniform Commercial Code Case Digest includes over 200 pages of di
gest entries covering cases citing the general good faith provision of the VCC. See
VCC REP.-DIG. (2000 REVISION) (Pike & Fischer, eds.) 426-629.
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dence. The good faith obligation imposed by the PECL is also,
undoubtedly, a key doctrine under that contract law. The pur
pose of this article is to compare the two.
There are general differences between the two good faith
obligations arising from the nature of the works of which they
are part. The PECL and its good faith provisions are the prod
uct of a committee without law-making authority, and are de
signed as a statement of derivative general legal norms rather
than a description of any existing body of law. Thus, the PECL
lacks formal legal authority, although the drafters envision
such authority arising through adoption or use of the Principles
by legislatures, judges, arbitrators, and contracting parties. 5 In
contrast, the DCC (including its provisions on good faith) has
been adopted as law throughout the D.S.6
The good faith obligations imposed by the PECL and the
DCC also differ in scope. The PECL contains general contrac
tual principles applicable to all varieties of contracts, regardless
of subject matter. In contrast, only certain specified varieties of
contracts fall under the DCC. For example, contracts for the
sale of goods are governed by Article 2 of the DCC,7 whereas
contracts for the sale of real property are beyond the scope of
the DCC and its good faith provisions. 8 Contracts which are not
See PECL, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxiv (Introduction).
Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have
adopted the UCC more or less in toto. See 1 U.L.A. 1-2 ("Uniform Commercial
Code: Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code has been Adopted") (Master ed. 1989 &
Supp. 2001). Louisiana has not adopted Articles 2 (sales) or 2A (leases) of the
UCC, but it has adopted other parts of the Code, including Article 1 which contains
the UCC's general good faith provisions. See id. at 2 n. 3. Individual jurisdictions
have sometimes enacted provisions that vary from the official text of the UCC,
although no jurisdiction has varied the text of § 1-203 on good faith. See id., "Ex
planation" at IV (explaining that variations by individual jurisdictions from the
official text of particular DCC provisions are described in sections entitled "Action
in Adopting Jurisdictions" in the text discussing each provision) and text at 109-18
(omitting section on "Action in Adopting Jurisdictions" from discussion ofUCC § 1
203 on good faith).
7 DCC § 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods").
8 The subjects covered by the uec are as follows: Article 1, general provi
sions; Article 2, sales of goods; Article 2A, leases of goods; Article 3, negotiable
instruments; Article 4, bank deposits and collections; Article 4A, funds transfers;
Article 5, letters of credit; Article 6, bulk sales; Article 7, documents of title; Article
8, investment securities; Article 9, secured transactions. Articles 10 and 11 con
tain technical provisions governing effective dates, repeal of prior laws and transi
5

6
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covered by the uee are governed by the general law of con
tracts, which in most U.s. jurisdictions also imposes an obliga
tion of good faith on contracting parties. 9 The good faith
tion rules. Note that significant parts of the UCC focus not on the law governing
parties to a contract, but on the law governing the rights and duties of third par
ties. Much of UCC Article 9, for example, deals with the rights of a debtor's credi
tors and other claimants to collateral that is subject to a security agreement
between the debtor and a secured creditor.
9 While the law is not always clear, the following states appear to imply an
obligation of good faith in every contract: Alaska (see McConnell v. State, Dept. of
Health and Social Services, Div. of Medical Assistance, 991 P.2d 178, 184 (Alaska
1999) ("in every contract ... there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing ..." quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska, 1979) and Arco
Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988)); Delaware (see Blish v. Thomp
son Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581 (De. Sup. Ct. 1948) and Shuster v. Der
ocili, 2001 WL 682105 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001)); Idaho (see Luzar v. Western Sur.
Co., 692 P.2d 337 (Idaho 1984) and Raedlien v. Boise Cascade Corp., 931 P.2d 621
(Idaho 1996)); Massachusetts (see Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Associates, 583
N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1991) and Fortune v. NCR, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977)); Mis
souri (see Slone v. Purina Mills, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App. 1996) and Morton
v. Hearst Corp., 779 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Mo. App. 1989) ("Missouri law implies a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract")); Montana (see Story v.
City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990) and Kittelson v. Archie Cochrane Mo
tors, 813 P.2d 424 (Mont. 1991)); New Hampshire (see Seaward Constr. Co. v. City
of Rochester, 383 A.2d 707 (N.H. 1978) and Harper v. Healthsource NH, 674 A.2d
692 (N.H. 1996)); New Jersey (see Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d
522 (N.J. 1965) and Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 701 A.2d 742 (N.J. Super.
1997)); South Carolina (see Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 147
S.E.2d 481 (S.C. 1966) and Williams v. Reidman, 529 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. App. 2000));
and Tennessee (Wallace v. National Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn.
1996) and Williams v. Maremont, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. App. 1988)).
The following states recognize a good faith obligation except in employment
at-will contracts: California (see Nelson v. Abraham, 177 P.2d 931 (Cal. 1947) and
Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Cal. 2000)); Colorado (see Amoco
Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995) and Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724
P.2d 1379 (Colo. App. 1986)); Connecticut (see Commerce Intern. Co. v. United
States, 338 F.2d 81 (Ct. Cl. 1964) and Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 528 A.2d
1137, 1142 (Conn. 1987) (''Where an employment contract is clearly terminable at
will, however, a party cannot ordinarily be deemed to lack good faith in exercising
this right. Thus, absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety
which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a
dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"); Florida
(see Sheck v. Burger King, 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla 1992) and Crawford v. David
Shapiro & Co., 490 So. 2d 993 (Fla. App. 1986)); Hawaii (see Best Place, Inc. v.
Penn America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996) and Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc. 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982)); Illinois (see Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank,
154 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. 1958) and Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 546 N.E.2d
248 (Ill. App. 1989)); Iowa (see Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291
N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1980) and Phipps v. IASD Health Servo Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198
(Iowa 1977)); Kansas (see Moriss V. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987)
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obligation imposed by the common or general law of contracts,
("the principle oflaw stated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, that every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its per
formance and its enforcement, is overly broad and should not be applicable to em
ployment-at-will contracts"); Louisiana (see Bond v. Allemand, 632 So.2d 326 (La.
App. 1993) and Stanton v. Tulane Univ., 777 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. 2001»; Michi
gan (see Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. GMC, 873 F.2d 873 W Cir. 1989) and Hammond
v. United of Oakland, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. App. 1992»; Minnesota (see In
re Hennepin County 1986 Recycling Bond Litigation, 540 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. 1995)
and Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986»);
Mississippi (see UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So.
2d 746 (Miss. 1987) and Hartle v. Packard Elec., a Div. of General Motors Corp.
626 So.2d 106 (Miss.,1993»); Nebraska (see Cimino v. FirsTier Bank, N.A., 530
N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 1995) and Stratton v. Chevrolet Motor Div., General Motors
Corp., 428 N.W.2d 910 (Neb. 1988»; Nevada (see Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch
Lewis Productions, Inc. 808 P.2d 919 (Nev. 1991) and Martin v. Sears, Roebouck,
and Co., 899 P.2d 551 (Nev. 1995»; New Mexico (see Watson Truck & Supply Co. v.
Males, 801 P.2d 639 (N.M. 1990) and Sanchez v. The New Mexican, 738 P.2d 1321
(N.M. 1987»; New York (see Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.K
163 (N.Y. 1933) and Ingle v. Glamore, 535 N.K2d 1311 (N.Y. 1987»; North Caro
lina (see Weyerhauser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 253 S.K2d 625 (N.C. App.
1979) and Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 412 S.K2d 97 (N.C. App. 1991»;
Oklahoma (see First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502 (Okla. 1993)
and Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989»; Oregon (see Perkins v. Stan
dard Oil Co., 383 P.2d 107 (Or. 1963) and Elliot v. Tektronix Inc., 796 P.2d 361 (Or.
App. 1990»; Pennsylvania (see Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. 1992)
and McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000»; South
Dakota (see Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990) and Breen v.
Dakota Gear and Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988»; Utah (see Zion's Proper
ties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975) and Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing
Co., 844 P.2d 203 (Utah 1993»; Vermont (see Shaw v. K!. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 226 A.2d 903 (Vt. 1967) and Ross v. Times Mirror, 665 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1995»;
Washington (see Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 410 P.2d 33 (Wash. 1966) and
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984»; Wisconsin (see
Chakya v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. 1970) and Kempfer v. Automated Finish
ing, 564 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1997»; and Wyoming (see Roussalis v. Wyoming Medi
cal Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209 (Wyo. 2000) and VanLente v. University of Wyo. Research
Corp., 975 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1999».
In the following states that recognize an implied obligation of good faith under
their general law of contract, it is not clear if the obligation extends to employ
ment-at-will agreements: Alabama (see World's Exposition Shows v. Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks, 180 So. 721 (Ala. 1939»; Arizona (see Rawlings v.
Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986) (insurance contracts) and Arizona's Towing
Professionals, Inc. v. State, 993 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. App. 1999»; Arkansas (see Can
trell-Waind & Assoc., Inc. v. Guillame Motorsports, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 72 (Ark. App.
1998); Georgia (see Whisenant v. Fulton Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 406
S.K2d 393 (Ga. App. 1991»; Kentucky (see Odem Realty Co. v. Dyer, 45 S.W.2d
838 (Ky. 1932»; Maryland (see Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166
(Md. 1964»; and Rhode Island (see Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 297 A.2d 643
(R.I. 1972».

-----_.-..---_.
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furthermore, corresponds in most respects to the good faith obli
gation of the VCC.lO Nevertheless, the VCC good faith provi
sions which I focus upon in this article apply to a more limited
group of contracts than does the good faith obligation imposed
by the PECL.
Beyond these general differences in the good faith obliga
tions, which derive from the nature of the PECL and the VCC,
both documents take similar approaches in imposing a direct
good faith obligation on the parties to a contract l l and in re
stricting the right of the parties to contract out of this obliga
tion. Indeed, a careful comparison of the text of the good faith
The following states do not appear to recognize an implied covenant of good
faith as part of their general law of contract: Indiana (see First Federal Say. Bank
v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. 1990»; Maine (see First NH Banks
Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248 (Me. 1992)); North Dakota (see Hilles
land v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987»; Texas (see English
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983»; and Virginia (see Ward's Equipment, Inc.
v. New Holland North America, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1997)).
It is not clear whether Ohio law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith
as part ofits general contract law. See Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 723 N.E.2d
128, 135 (Ohio App. 1998) (stating that Ohio law imposes an implied covenant of
good faith in "some contracts, such as those between an insurer and an insured
and to commercial contracts regulated by Ohio's Uniform Commercial Code," but
failing to state whether the implied obligation extends to other contracts) (cita
tions omitted). Courts apparently have not ruled on whether West Virginia gen
eral contract law encompasses an implied obligation of good faith.
10 See. e.g., Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 169-170
(3 rd Cir. 2001) ("Good faith is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted
in New Jersey, as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.' Al
though the UCC is inapplicable to the Emerson-Orion License Agreement, which
was not a contract for the sale of goods, it is unlikely the concept of good faith
would be defined differently by the New Jersey Supreme Court merely because the
contract at issue is a license," quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 12A:1-20l(19».
11 Contrast the good faith provision ofthe United Nations Convention on Con
tracts for the Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 19
I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG] art. 7(1) (entered into force on Jan. 1., 1988),
available in 15 U.S.CA app. at 49 (West Supp. 1996), 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-80, 7737
(1987), U.N. DOC. AlCONF. 97/18 (1980). Article 7(1) of the CISG does not di
rectly impose an obligation of good faith on the parties to contracts of sale within
its scope, but rather imposes an obligation on those interpreting the CISG to do so
in a fashion that promotes, inter alia, "the observance of good faith in international
trade." For a discussion of this distinction and ofthe CISG's good faith provision in
general, see PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) Art. 7 <j[<j[ 15-18 (trans. Geoffrey Thomas)
(2 nd ed. in translation); Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on Contracts for the In
ternational Sale of Goods (CISGj - A Leap Forward towards Unified International
Sales Laws, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 79, 92-103 (2000).
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provisions of the two documents, which I pursue in Part II of
this Article, reveals further hidden similarities. There are, un
surprisingly, some textual differences between the two rules
and, as the discussion in Part II demonstrates, these textual
differences create some divergence in the good faith obligations
imposed by the PECL and the DCC. On the whole, however,
the approaches of the general good faith provisions of the two
documents are, from a textual perspective, notably similar.
"Good faith" is a notoriously amorphous and variable con
cept. Thus it is the interpretation and application of the doc
trine that provides the most important point of comparison for
the two sets of rules. The DCC has been in force since the
1950's, and its good faith provisions have been applied in hun
dreds of cases. In contrast, the PECL is a new phenomenon and
its good faith rules, to my knowledge, have not been applied to
actual cases. The tools for a preliminary comparison of how the
good faith obligation of the two documents will be applied, nev
ertheless, already exist. The comment to PECL Article 1:201
includes five concrete illustrations of how the drafters conceive
its good faith rule will operate, as well as other suggestions con
cerning the application of the good faith obligation to particular
situations. In Part III of this article I will explore how D.S.law,
and the DCC good faith provision in particular, would apply to
the factual examples adduced in the PECL comment. This dis
cussion reveals mixed results. First, there exist some notable
similarities in the operation of the good faith obligation under
the PECL and the DCC. Second, there are some situations in
which D.S. law would likely reach the same result as under the
PECL by invoking doctrines other than good faith. Finally,
there may be some important situations in which the outcome
under D.S. law would probably diverge from that suggested by
the comment to PECL Article 1:201. Although it is important to
keep in mind the similarities in the good faith principles of the
PECL and the DCC, it is also important to recognize that the
divergent outcomes appear to reflect deep-seated differences in
the legal cultures behind the two documents.

302
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COMPARING THE TEXT OF THE GOOD FAITH PROVISIONS OF
THE PECL AND THE VCC

The basic good faith provision ofthe PECL, Article 1:201(1),
states simply that "[e]ach party must act in accordance with
good faith and fair dealing." The corresponding provision of the
VCC, section 1-203, provides that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act [Le., the VCC] imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." There are at least two
noteworthy differences in the phrasing of these provisions.
First, the PECL imposes obligations of both "good faith"
and "fair dealing," whereas the VCC limits the obligation sim
ply to "good faith." Part E of the comment to PECL Article
1:201, entitled "Good faith and fair dealing distinguished," sug
gests that the double obligation imposed by the PECL is not
mere verbiage, but carries an important distinction: "'Good
faith' means honesty and fairness in mind, which are subjective
concepts.. " 'Fair dealing' means observance offairness in fact,
which is an objective test ...."12 This distinction between the
double-edged, subjective and objective obligation imposed by
the PECL and the single obligation of "good faith" imposed by
VCC section 1-203 is both reinforced and limited by the VCC
definitions of "good faith."13 The general VCC definition of
"good faith" in section 1-201(19) states that the term means
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." This
definition is widely recognized as creating a subjective standard
of good faith,14 often described as the "pure heart, empty head"
12 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt. E, at 115-116 ("Good faith and fair
dealing distinguished").
13 The PECL, which generally eschews statutory definitions of terms, does not
contain a formal definition of either "good faith" or "fair dealing." The language
quoted in the text from the PECL art. 1-201, cmt. E, distinguishing "good faith"
and "fair dealing," however, contains de facto definitions of the terms.
14 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d
1407,1416 (7 th Cir. 1988) (referring to "the subjective standard of good faith found
in the general definitions section ofthe UCC"); 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-203:1 at art.I-218 (1998) ("Section 1-201(19) states
the generally applicable subjective 'white heart and empty head' standard which
concentrates on the actual state of mind of the party rather than on the state of
mind a reasonable man would have had under the same circumstances. Thus, the
section defines good faith as honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con
cerned."); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV 195,207-11 (1968).
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standard.15
Merchants involved in sale or lease transactions governed
by Dee Articles 2 or 2A, as well as those dealing with negotia
ble instruments governed by Dee Article 3, funds transfers
governed by Dee Article 4A, transfers of investment securities
governed by Dee Article 8, and security interests in personal
property governed by Dee Article 9, are subject to an extended
defInition of "good faith" - "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."16 This def
inition encompasses both a subjective obligation ("honesty in
fact") and an objective obligation ("observance of reasonable
commercial standards");17 the statutory defInition goes so far as
to label the objective aspect an obligation of "fair dealing."18
This, obviously, parallels the subjective/objective "good faith
and fair dealing" obligation imposed by PEeL Article 1:201(1).
The extended defInition applies only to certain transactions
governed by the Dee. Thus it limits but does not totally elimi
nate the difference between the good faith obligations imposed
by the PEeL and the Dee. For example, non-merchants in
volved in sales or leases and those engaged in letter of credit
transactions governed by Dee Article 5 are subject only to the
subjective good faith obligation.l9 It has been argued, further
15 See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d
1407, 1416 (7 th Cir. 1988); First Nat. Bank of Cicero v. D.S., 664 F. Supp. 1169,
1173 (N.D. IlU987); Mariani v. Redman & Ranch, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1011, 1013
(N.D. Ill. 1973); Denise R. Boklach, Comment: Commercial Transactions: U.C.C.
Section 1-201 (19) Good Faith-Is Now the Time to Abandon the Pure Heart / Empty
Head Test?, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 647 (1992). Cf HAWKLAND, supra note 14 ("white
heart and empty head" standard).
16 DCC § 2-103(1)(b), defming "[g]ood faith in the case of a merchant" for pur
poses of DCC Article 2. The definition of good faith for merchants in DCC § 2
103(1)(b) adds the phrase "in the trade" at the end. Pursuant to DCC § 2A-103(3),
the Article 2 definition of "good faith" for merchants applies under DCC Article 2A
on leasing of goods. DCC §§ 3-103(a)(4) 4A-105(a)(6), 8-102(a)(10) and 9-102(a)(43)
impose the definition of "good faith" quoted in the text to DCC Articles 3, 4A, 8 and
9 respectively.
17 For discussion recognizing the "objective" aspect of the "good faith" defmi
tion in DCC § 2-103(1)(b), see HAWKLAND, supra note 14, arts. 1-218 - 1-219.
18 Indeed, some courts have rather cavalierly characterized DCC § 1-203 as
creating a general duty of "good faith and fair dealing." See Conoco Inc. v. Inman
Oil Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 895,908 (8 th Cir.1985); Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 908 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (D. Conn. 1995).
19 The good faith obligations of non-merchants under Articles 2 and 2A would
be governed by the purely subjective (''honesty in fact") definition in DCC § 1
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more, that the "objective" aspect of the good faith definition in
VCC section 2-103(1)(b), applicable to merchants engaged in
sales transactions, applies only if the trade involved in the
transaction has developed standards of fair dealing, and only if
those standards are "reasonable"; in the absence of such reason
able trade standards, it is asserted, only the subjective aspect of
good faith applies. 20 In contrast, the obligation of fair dealing in
PECL Article 1:201(1) is not limited to circumstances in which
there are reasonable trade standards offair dealing (although if
they exist, such standards should presumably influence the in
terpretation of the obligation of fair dealing). This might sug
gest a difference in the application of the VCC and the PECL
good faith obligations in circumstances where proof of reasona
ble trade standards is lacking. 21
Recently, the organizations that sponsor the VCC - the
American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Vniform State Law ("NCCVSL") - have ap
proved amendments to Article 1 that would alter the general
VCC definition of "good faith" to require both subjective "hon
esty in fact" and objective "observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing."22 The new definition would apply
throughout the VCC except under Article 5 (letters of credit).23
The amendments would bring the VCC good faith obligation
closer to the one provided for in the PECL. This revision to the
VCC definition of "good faith" was approved very recently. For
this reason, the amended definition has not yet been adopted by
any jurisdiction.

201(19). DCC Article 5 has explicitly adopted the purely subjective defmition of
good faith. See DCC § 5-102(a)(7) and the comment thereto.
20 See Summers, supra note 14, at 213.
21 In other words, absent proof of reasonable trade standards, the DCC might
not impose an "objective" good faith obligation on merchants involved in sales
transactions, whereas lack of such trade standards would not impact the objective
duty of fair dealing under the PECL.
22 DCC § 1-201(1)(19), Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 1- Gen
eral Provisions, Approval Draft Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the National
Conference of Co=issioners on Uniform State Laws August 10-17, 2001, (§ 1
201(a)(19)), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bWuldulcjrame.htm (last vis
ited August 31, 2001).
23 See DCC § 5-102(a)(7). DCC Article 5 contains its own definition of "good
faith" limited to ''honesty in fact."

.

2001]

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

305

Another significant textual difference between the UCC
and the PECL good faith provisions is that the good faith obliga
tion imposed by UCC section 1-203 applies only if and when a
contract falling within the scope of the UCC has been formed.
The UCC provision states that the good faith obligation arises
from a "contract or duty within this Act," and phrases the obli
gation in terms of "its [i.e., the contract's or duty's] performance
or enforcement."24 Thus under the UCC "[g]ood faith and fair
dealing are not independent requirements; instead, they arise
from, and are dependent upon, the existence of an enforceable
contract."25 While some courts have held that, in certain cir
cumstances, the parties' preliminary negotiations and agree
ments have resulted in a contract to negotiate in good faith
toward a final agreement,26 U.S. law continues to adhere to the
rule that there is no good faith obligation before a contract has
been formed. PECL Article 1:201, in contrast, does not condi
tion the good faith duty it imposes on the existence of a formed
contract: it states, very generally, that "[e]ach party must act in
accordance with good faith and fair dealing,"27 without limiting
the obligation to situations where contractual rights or duties
have already arisen. This unconditional phrasing stands in
contrast to an earlier version of the PECL good faith provision,
which stated: "In exercising his rights and performing his du
ties each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing."28 The phrasing ofthe earlier version implied that the
good faith obligation was confined to situations where a con
tract and its attendant rights and duties already existed. The
change in the phrasing to the current version rebuts that
implication.
Several other parts of the current version of the PECL con
firm this conclusion. A new provision, PECL Article 2:301, ex
plicitly extends the obligation of good faith and fair dealing to
24

VCC § 1-203.

Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 908 F. Supp. 1084, 1091
(D. Conn. 1995).
26 See, e.g., Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 96 F.3d
275 (7 th Cir. 1996).
27 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201.
28 THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAw, THE PRINCIPLES OF EURO.
PEAN CONTRACT LAw: PART 1: PERFORMANCE, NON-PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES,
art. 1-106 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale, eds. 1995).
25

----_ .. ----
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the negotiation stage of contract formation. 29 The comment to
PECL Article 1:201 states that the culpa in contrahendo doc
trine found in Article 2:301 is a "particular application" of the
general good faith duty imposed by the PECL.30 An illustration
in the comment to the PECL's general good faith provision, fur
thermore, applies the good faith obligation to the pre-contract
formation period. 31 Thus, it is clear from a textual comparison
that the scope of the good faith obligation imposed by the PECL
is broader than that under the VCC: the PECL obligation ex
tends to the negotiation phase of the relationship between the
parties, whereas the VCC good faith obligation does not. This
difference is explored further in the discussion below regarding
application of the doctrines.32
Both the PECL and the VCC expressly restrict the power of
contracting parties to disclaim or limit the obligation of good
faith. The PECL limitation on party autonomy in this area ap
pears, on its face, complete; Article 1:201(2) provides simply
that "[t]he parties may not exclude or limit this duty [i.e., the
duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed in Article
1:201(1)]."33 The comment to PECL Article 1:201 explains that
this provision means "that the parties cannot by their agree
ment exclude the duty of good faith and fair dealing .... [n]or
can they vary its effects."34 The VCC limitation on the parties'
ability to contract out ofthe good faith obligation, found in VCC
section 1-102(3), is also by its terms virtually impregnable 
"the obligations of [inter alia] good faith .... prescribed by this
29

PECL Article 2:301 provides:

(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an

agreement.
(2) However, a party which has negotiated or broken off negotiations con
trary to good faith and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the
other party.
(3) It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to
enter into or continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an
agreement with the other party.
30 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt. A, at 113. ("Good faith and fair
dealing").
31 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:101, cmt. B, illus. 1, at 114 ("Not confined to
specific rules").
32 See infra text accompanying notes 50-82.
33 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201(2).
34 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt. H, at 114 ("Article 1:201 is
mandatory").
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Act may not be disclaimed by agreement."35 The same VCC
provision, however, allows for minimal party autonomy when it
states that "the parties may by agreement determine the stan
dards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
The ability of parties, under the VCC, to define standards of
good faith (provided such standards are not "manifestly unrea
sonable") may suggest a minor difference from the PECL. Com
ment H to PECL Article 1:201, however, hints at a similar
allowance of party autonomy:
What is good faith will, however, to some extent depend upon
what was agreed upon by the parties in their contract. Thus, par
ties may agree that even a technical breach may entitle the ag
grieved party to refuse performance, when, for instance, its
agents can ascertain a technical breach but not whether it is a
trifle or not. 36

III.

COMPARING

THE

PECL AND

THE

VCC GOOD

FAITH

OBLIGATIONS AS APPLIED

A. Application of the Good Faith Principle in General
While textual comparison takes us part of the way in the
quest for similarities and differences in the good faith obliga
tions of the PECL and the VCC, a more critical tool for compar
ing the obligations is to understand the manner in which they
will be interpreted and applied. With a concept as vague as
"good faith" at their core, PECL Article 1:201 and VCC section
1-203 are subject to an extremely broad range of constructions.
As the "Notes" to PECL Article 1:201 indicate, even among Eu
ropean States there is "a considerable difference between the
legal systems as to how extensive and how powerful the pene
tration of the principle [of good faith and fair dealing] has been,"
and the various European jurisdictions ''have not given it the
same degree of penetration into their law of contract."37 The
PECL Notes describe a "spectrum" of applications of the good
faith principle:
35

DCC § 1-102(3).

36

Id.

37

PECL, supra note 1, at 116-17.
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At the one end of the spectrum figures a system where the princi
ple has revolutionized the contract law (and other parts of the law
as well) and added a special feature to the style of that system
(GERMANY). At the other end we find systems which do not rec
ognize a general obligation of the parties to conform to good faith,
but which in many cases by specific rules reach the results which
the other systems have reached by the principle of good faith (EN
GLAND and IRELAND).... The other systems in the European
Union range between the two opposites. 38

It is clear that, in general, the drafters of the PECL favor
an extensive and robust application of the good faith principle
along the lines of the Treue und Glauben concept in the German
system, and they expressly reject the restrained use of the good
faith concept in English law:
There are many examples of [English and Irish] courts interpret
ing the terms of a contract in such a way as to prevent one party
using a clause in circumstances in which it was probably not in
tended to apply. . . . Thus to some extent Article 1:201 [of the
PEeL] merely articulates trends already present in English law.
But the English approach based on construction of the agreement
is a weak one as it cannot prevail against clear contrary provi
sions in the agreement .... or even clear implication from the
circumstances.... Thus Article 1:201 represents an advance on
English and Irish law. 39

The general approach under the UCC at first appears to
resemble that of the PECL. Unlike English and Irish law, the
UCC clearly imposes a general good faith obligation on con
tracting parties. The manner in which the UCC good faith pro
visions are interpreted and applied, however, tends to bring
them closer to the English approach.
For example, the Notes to PECL Article 1:201 quoted above
criticize the inability of English law to overcome express provi
sions of a contract by application of the good faith principle. As
explained below at greater length,40 American courts have con
sistently held that the UCC good faith provision cannot be used
to contradict or overrule express contractual terms. The Notes
to PECL Article 1:201 also reject the English approach of con
38
39
40

[d.
[d. at 117-18.
See infra text accompanying notes 94-108.
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fining the good faith concept to a principle of interpretation or
construction of the contract. The official comment to Dee sec
tion 1-203, in contrast, makes it clear that the Dee good faith
principle is strictly one of contract interpretation: "the doctrine
of good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting con
tracts within the commercial context in which they are created,
performed, and enforced ...."41 This language was added to
the Dee comment by the Dee Permanent Editorial Board (the
"Board") in 1994, and the commentary that accompanied the
amendment strenuously emphasized that the Dee good faith
provision is merely an interpretative tool for discovering the
reasonable expectations of the parties based on their
agreement. 42
The 1994 amendments to the official comment to Dee sec
tion 1-203 were designed to address a specific issue concerning
the construction of the Dee good faith obligation, and the man
ner in which that issue was resolved also suggests considerable
distance from the robust good faith principle of the PEeL.
Before the comment was amended, a question had arisen
whether an alleged violation of the Dee good faith obligation
that was not connected to a breach of a more specific duty im
posed by the contract or the rules of the Dee would support an
"independent" cause of action. Several courts had held that the
Dee good faith provision was "directive" rather than "remedial"
- Le., merely alleging a breach of the duty of good faith under
Dee section 1-203, as opposed to alleging a breach of a particu
lar contract provision or duty imposed by the VCC (as inter
preted in "good faith"), was not a sufficient basis for claiming a
remedy.43 Although not all courts agreed,44 the Board came
down clearly on the side of those decisions that had restricted
the use of the good faith principle. The Board concluded that
UCC § 1-203, cmt.
See Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB
Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No. 10 (Section 1
203) Final Draft, February 10, 1994, reprinted in [FINDEX and PEB Commenta
ries] UCC REP. Servo (1994).
43 See, e.g., Tanner v. Church's Fried Chicken, 582 So. 2d 449, 451-52 (Ala.
1991); Korogluyan v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 572 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Ill. App.
1991); Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Tex. App. 1989).
44 See, e.g., Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W. 2d 517,
535-37 (Mo. App. 1986); St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,
811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991).
41

42

---,._--_.,-, ..• _~::.;",.:-;_ ..
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"Section 1-203 does not support a cause of action where no other
basis for a cause of action exists,"45 and it added the following
language to the Official Comment to that section:
This section [1-203] does not support an independent cause of ac
tion for failure to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this
section means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a
specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a breach
of that contract or makes unavailable, under the particular cir
cumstances, a remedial right or power. This distinction makes it
clear that the doctrine of good faith merely directs a court towards
interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which
they are created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be inde
pendently breached. 46

Thus the DCC general good faith obligation has been
treated as a relatively weak background or interpretative prin
ciple lacking sufficient independence to support a cause of ac
tion for breach unless the breach can be attached to another
legal rule, or a particular express or implied contract provision.
This undoubtedly reflects the traditional distrust in the English
common law tradition, which is the foundation for D.S. contract
law, of the vagueness of the good faith concept, and the sense
that a strong good faith principle would give judges a dangerous
power to create contractual obligations to which the parties had
not actually agreed. 47 The interpretation of the DCC general
45 PEB Commentary No. (Section 1-203), supra note 42, reprinted in [FINDEX
and PEB Commentaries] DCC REP. Servo at 5.
46 DCC § 1-203, cmt. The recently-approved revisions to DCC Article 1 men
tioned in the text accompanying notes 22-23 supra change none of this. Except for
renumbering the section that provides for the DCC general good faith obligation
(currently § 1-203, changed to §1-304 in revised Article 1) and changing the defini
tion of "good faith" (as described previously), the revisions leave the DCC good
faith obligation substantively untouched, and the language from the current offi
cial comment quoted in the text accompanying this note is continued verbatim in
the revised version. See Approval Draft of Revision of DCC Article 1, supra note
22, § 1-304 and "preliminary comment" thereto.
47 Cf E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the
UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3
TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 47, 55 (1995) (noting that the CISG (see supra note 11)
lacks an express provision imposing a good faith obligation on parties to interna
tional sales contracts because some delegates to the diplomatic conference at
which the CISG was approved, "including delegates form common law countries,
feared that this would be too unrestricted a mandate to judges in an international
setting and therefore opposed any references to a general principle of good faith.")
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good faith obligation as a limited and subsidiary interpretative
principle stands in contrast to the assertive role for good faith
envisioned by the drafters of the PECL.
B. Specific Examples of the Application of the Good Faith
Obligation

The fundamental difference between the weak conception
of good faith under the UCC and the robust good faith principle
of the PECL can be most clearly demonstrated by comparing
the application of the two good faith obligations to specific situ
ations. The UCC material for such a comparison is readily
available: courts have applied the UCC good faith provisions in
hundreds of reported decisions over the decades during which
the Code has been in force. To my knowledge, however, no tri
bunal has yet based a decision on the PECL good faith principle.
Nevertheless, there already exist several descriptions of how
the drafters of the PECL envisioned its good faith provision
would apply to particular factual scenarios: the comment to
PECL Article 1:201 contains five "illustrations" of the applica
tion of the provision, and the drafters included other comments
suggesting how the good faith concept would apply to specific
situations. A good preliminary indication of how the good faith
principles of the UCC and the PECL compare "in action" can be
obtained by comparing the results under the PECL and the
UCC in the fact situations mentioned in the PECL comments.
The results of this comparison fall into three categories; in
some situations, the good faith principles of the PEeL and the
UCC yield the same result; in a second group of situations, U.S.
law employs doctrines other than good faith to produce results
similar to those reached under the PECL good faith principle; in
a third set of situations, U.S. law appears to reach a different
outcome than that produced by the PECL good faith provision.
1.

Termination for Trivial Breach

One example of how the drafters conceived the PECL good
faith provision would apply to a particular factual scenario is
found in Part B of the comment to PECL Article 1:201. To illus
trate the point that the good faith obligation "may take prece
dence over other provisions of these Principles when a strict
adherence to them would lead to a manifestly unjust result,"
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the comment notes that "even if the non-performance of an obli
gation is fundamental because strict compliance with the obli
gations is of the essence of the contract under Article 8:103, a
party would not be permitted to terminate because of a trivial
breach of the obligation."48 The reference to PECL Article 8:103
presumably is to part (a) thereof, which permits parties to agree
that any failure to perform the terms of a contract will consti
tute "fundamental non-performance."49 A "fundamental non
performance," in turn, allows the aggrieved party, inter alia, to
terminate the contract. 50 In other words, the comment indi
cates that, even ifthe contract requires "perfect" performance, a
party who suffers a breach will not have the right to terminate
for a trivial breach if doing so would violate its obligation of
good faith under PECL Article 1:201.
The VCC good faith provisions probably yield the same re
sult. For example, a Texas Appeals court construing a buyer's
rights under the "perfect tender rule" of VCC section 2-601,
which permits a buyer to reject goods if they fail "in any respect
to conform to the contract," stated:
If the evidence does establish nonconformity in some respect, the
buyer is entitled to reject if he rejects in good faith. [DCC section
1-203] provides that, "Every contract or duty within this Act im
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce
ment." Since the rejection of goods is a matter of performance, the
buyer is obligated to act in good faith when he rejects the
goods. . . . Evidence of circumstances which indicate that the
buyer's motivation in rejecting the goods was to escape the bar
gain, rather than to avoid acceptance of a tender which in some
respect impairs the value of the bargain to him, would support a
finding of rejection in bad faith.... Thus evidence of rejection of
48

PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt. B, at 113 ("Not confined to specific

rules").
49 PECL Article 8:103(a) provides that "[a] non-performance of an obligation
is fundamental to the contract if: (a) strict compliance with the obligation is ofthe
essence of the contract ...." As a comment to PECL Article 8:103 explains:
Under Article 8:103(a) the relevant factor is not the actual gravity of the
breach but the agreement between the parties that strict adherence to the
contract is essential and that any deviation from the obligation goes to the
root of the contract so as to entitle the other party to be discharged from
its obligations under the contract.
PECL, supra note 1, art. 8:103, cmt. B, at 364 ("Compliance with contractual
obligations").
50 See id. art. 9:301(1).
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goods on account of a minor defect in a falling market would in
some instances be sufficient to support a finding that the buyer
acted in bad faith when he rejected the goodS. 51

This approach was adopted by a Kansas Appeals Court in
Baker v. Ratzlaff,52 where a seller of popcorn invoked a contract
clause, included at the seller's insistence, giving him the right
to terminate the contract if the buyer failed to pay upon deliv
ery.53 The buyer, a commercial popcorn dealer, had received
the first two deliveries under the contract.54 The seller had not
requested nor did the buyer make payment upon delivery.55 In
stead, following its normal practice, the buyer issued the seller
"weight tickets" which at the end of each week would be sent to
the buyer's administrative offices for payment by check.56 Al
though the buyer's administrative offices were on the route the
seller took in making deliveries, the seller did not stop and seek
payment after making the first two deliveries. 57 When the
buyer contacted the seller to inquire about future deliveries, the
seller said nothing about payment for the first two deliveries.58
Approximately a week after making the initial deliveries, after
the market price of popcorn had risen sharply, the seller unex
pectedly issued a notice terminating the contract because the
51 Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W. 2d
779, 784 (Tex. App. 1984). As authority for its views on good faith and rejection of
goods, the Supermind court cited Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272
(Ala. 1979), which held that a buyer's rejection of potatoes was invalid because it
was done in bad faith. In Neumiller Farms, the buyer claimed that the goods
breached a clause in the contract requiring that potatoes delivered under the con
tract be "to buyer satisfaction." The evidence strongly suggested that the potatoes
tendered by the seller were perfectly suitable, and that the buyer was searching for
a pretext to escape the fixed price contract after market prices for potatoes fell
steeply. Courts have long implied a good faith obligation in connection with per
sonal satisfaction clauses such as that invoked by the buyer in Neumiller Farms.
See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 103B at 565 (3 rd ed.
1990). Thus the holding in Neumiller Farms can be narrowly understood as an
application of the traditional doctrine that personal satisfaction clauses must be
used in good faith rather than as an example of a general obligation under the
VCC to reject goods only in good faith. Indeed, the court never actually cited or
invoked the general good faith obligation under VCC § 1-203.
52 564 P.2d 153 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).

53Id.
54Id.
55Id.
56
57
58

See id. at 155-56.
See Baker, 564 P.2d at 155.
See id.
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buyer had failed to pay for the first installments upon deliv
ery.59 Immediately after receiving the notice, the buyer issued
checks for the first two deliveries, but the seller persisted in the
termination and resold the balance of his popcorn at the higher
market prices. 60 The trial court, later affirmed by the appeals
court, held that the seller had violated his obligation of good
faith under DCC section 1-203 "by declaring a termination of
the contract upon a technical pretense,"61 and the buyer was
awarded damages. 62
Thus, the DCC good faith principle has been construed to
limit a party's right to terminate a contract because of a trivial
breach, even where the law grants the party a right to termi
nate for any breach. In this scenario the DCC good faith doc
trine operates in much the same way as the PECL good faith
obligation. This convergence in result is not particularly sur
prising. According to the Notes to PECL Article 1:201, even En
glish law, which does not recognize an implied general
obligation of good faith in its contract law and which the PECL
Notes identify as the European jurisdiction in which the good
faith principle has made the least "penetration,"63 reaches the
same result. 64 Limiting a party's right to terminate a contract
in bad faith for a trivial breach thus appears to be a minimal
requirement of good faith, found even in jurisdictions with the
least robust conception ofthe principle. It is to be expected that
the DCC, which includes an express general obligation of good
faith, should be interpreted to provide for this result, particu
larly when English law (in which, outside of Louisiana, D.S.
contract law has its roots) does so.
See id.
See id.
61 See id. at 156.
62 See id. at 155. U.S. courts have reached similar results without invoking
the obligation of good faith. See, e.g., Foundation Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann's, Inc.,
788 P.2d 1189 (Ariz. 1990) (invoking the material breach doctrine in refusing to
permit a lessor to terminate a commercial lease merely because the lessee was two
days late in making lease payments, despite a clause in the lease providing that
"time is of the essence" of the contract).
63 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, at 116.
64 See id. at 117 (asserting that English courts ''have on occasion limited the
right of a party who is the victim of a slight breach of contract to terminate the
contract on that ground when the real motive appears to be to escape a bad bar
gain" [citing cases]).
59

60

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

2001]

2.

315

Good Faith in Contract Formation (PECL Illustration 1)

The comments to PECL Article 1:201 contain five formal
illustrations of how the PECL good faith obligation would apply
to specific situations. Illustration 1 relates to contract
formation:
In its offer to B, A specifies that in order for B's acceptance to be
effective B must send it directly to A's business headquarters
where it must be received within 8 days. An employee of B over
looks this statement and sends the acceptance to A's local agent
who immediately transmits it to A's headquarters where it is re
ceived 4 days later. A cannot avoid the contract. 65

According to the PECL comment, this result illustrates a more
general axiom: "The principle of good faith and fair dealing also
covers situations where a party without any good reason stands
on ceremony."66
If the situation in Illustration 1 arose under the VCC, it
would almost certainly not be treated as an issue of good faith.
As was discussed previously,67 the good faith obligation pro
vided for by VCC section 1-203 has been held to arise only when
some "contract or duty" governed by the VCC already exists,
and thus it does not extend into the pre-contractual period.
While other principles of V.S. law that may serve to police bad
faith behavior have been applied to the negotiating phase of the
contracting process - perhaps most famously, the promissory es
toppel doctrine in the well-known case of Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc. 68 - the good faith principle has not. This stands in
marked contrast to most European jurisdictions, which recog
nize a good faith obligation (often associated with the Latin
phrase "culpa in contrahendo") applicable to parties engaged in
negotiating a contract. 69
65

PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt., illus. 1, at 114.

66Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
69 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:301, at 191-192 (describing the good faith
obligation that arises during contract negotiations under the laws of Germany,
Austria, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Denmark and Swe
den). PECL Article 2:301 expressly adopts this approach, providing specifically for
liability if contract negotiations are conducted or broken off "contrary to good faith
and fair dealing."
67

68
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On the specific facts of Illustration 1, a different result
could well be reached under the UCC. U.S. general contract law
follows the maxim that "the offeror is master of the offer," with
the consequence that offerors are permitted to specify the pre
cise manner in which their offers can be accepted. 70 No contract
is formed ifthe specified manner of acceptance is not followed. 71
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains the fol
lowing illustration of this rule, which is in effect a counter-ex
ample to PECL Illustration l.
A sends a letter to B stating the terms of a proposed contract. At
the end he writes, "you can accept this offer only by signing on the
dotted line below my own signature." A replies by telegram, "1
accept your offer." There is no contract. 72

According to this example, U.S. general contract law permits an
offeror who has specified an exclusive manner of acceptance to
act contrary to the comment to the PECL good faith provision:
in other words, under U.S. law, a party apparently is permitted
"without good reason to stand on ceremony." On the other
hand, if an offeror fails to indicate a specific and exclusive man
ner for accepting the offer, U.S. general contract law permits
the offeree to accept in any reasonable manner. 73 The Restate
ment (Second) of Contracts, furthermore, suggests a preference
for construing language that specifies a manner of acceptance
as not intended to be exclusive, thus permitting other reasona
ble methods of accepting. 74 The UCC contract formation rules
follow the same line. uee section 2-206(1) permits an offeror to
specify an exclusive manner of acceptance, but only if it is done
"unambiguously."75 Otherwise, according to UCC section 2
70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CaNTS. § 30(1) & cmt. a (1981) ("The offeror
is the master of his offer.... [Tlhe offeror is entitled to insist on a particular mode
of assent.").
71 See id. § 60 & cmt. a.
72 Id. § 30, cmt a, illus. 1 For another example to the same effect, see id., § 60,
cmt. a, illus. 3.
73 See id. § 30(2).
74 See id. § 60 & cmt. a. See also, § 30 cmt. b ("Insistence on a particular form
of acceptance is unusual. Offerors often make no express reference to the form of
acceptance; sometimes ambiguous language is used. Language referring to a par
ticular mode of acceptance is often intended and understood as suggestion rather
than limitation; the suggested mode is then authorized, but other modes are not
precluded.").
75 VCC § 2-206(1).
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206(1)(a), the offeree can accept "in any manner and by any me
dium reasonable in the circumstances."76
Applying UCC section 2-206(1) to Illustration 1 may well
yield a result contrary to that under the PECL. If A in that
illustration has "unambiguously" indicated that B must send its
acceptance directly to A's business headquarters, as the facts
suggest is the case, no contract would result under the UCC
even though A received the acceptance through his or her agent
in a timely fashion. The situation is analogous to the illustra
tion in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts where the offeror
receives a telegraphic acceptance instead of the countersigna
ture acceptance specified in the offer, and no contract arises. Of
course in a situation like PECL Illustration 1, a U.s. court
would likely be eager to find some ambiguity in A's offer that
would permit a finding that the specified manner of acceptance
was not intended to be the only way to accept. If no such ambi
guity can be found, however, no contract would be formed. 77
The UCC good faith obligation, furthermore, would not change
that result, because it would not even apply to the contract-for
mation stage of the relationship between A and B.
There are several other doctrines available under the UCC
that might serve to protect B in a situation like that in PECL
Illustration 1. I have already mentioned Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc.,78 which invoked promissory estoppel to police mis
behavior during the contract-formation stage. This case held
that one who represents that a contract will be entered into,
knowing such representations will be relied upon by the other
party to the negotiations (and, indeed, encouraging such reli
ance), is liable for losses incurred by the other party when the
first party later refuses to enter into the contract. Although the
case was decided under general contract law rather than the
UCC, its approach is available in UCC transactions as a "sup
plementary principle" of contract law not displaced by specific
rules of the Code. 79 Unfortunately for B, the Red Owl doctrine
requires proof both that the aggrieved party relied upon some
promise or representation, and that such reliance was foresee
76
77
78
79

vee § 2-206(1)(a).
See vee § 2-206(1).
133 NW.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
See vee § 1-103.
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able to the party making the promise or representation. There
is no proof of either element on the facts of PECL IIIustration 1.
Waiver is another doctrine that has been invoked to over
come an offeree's failure to employ an exclusive manner of ac
ceptance. In Empire Machinery Co. v. Litton Business
Telephone Systems, so Empire made a written offer to purchase
certain telephone switching equipment from BTS Litton. The
offer stated that it could be accepted "only upon approval, ac
ceptance, and execution hereof by BTS at its home office," and it
included a signature line for such execution. S ! BTS never
signed the offer, but both parties behaved as if a contract had
been entered into (e.g., representing to third parties that a con
tract had been formed, and submitting and cashing a down pay
ment check). The court held that, under UCC section 2-206(1),
the offer specified an exclusive manner of acceptance (BTS sign
ing the offer sheet) that had not been followed, but that a con
tract had nevertheless been formed:
[I]t is clear under such circumstances that the offeror who has the
power to control the manner of acceptance may waive that re
quirement. It is equally clear that the offeree can rely upon that
manner of acceptance specified in the contract and the offeror's
"waiver" of the manner of acceptance cannot create a contract
without the assent of the offeree. This assent may be sufficiently
expressed by the conduct of the soliciting offeree so as to bring
into being a binding contract. S2

The court found the conduct in the case was sufficient to
establish a waiver by the offeror of the exclusive manner of ac
ceptance, and acquiescence in such waiver by the offeree, thus
permitting a contract to be formed despite BTS' failure to sign
the offer sheet. The Empire waiver doctrine, however, requires
affirmative language or conduct on the part of the offeror indi
cating that it is not insisting upon the exclusive manner of ac
ceptance specified in the offer. Unfortunately for B in PECL
Illustration 1, there is no evidence that A waived the require
ment that B transmit the acceptance directly to A.

80
81
82

566 P.2d 1044 (Ariz. 1977).
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1048.
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In short, without additional or changed facts, the result in
Illustration 1 to the PECL good faith provision would almost
certainly be different under the VCC than under the PECL, and
the VCC good faith doctrine would not alter that conclusion.
3. Luring a Party into a Time-Bar (PECL Illustration 2)
The second illustration of the application of the PECL good
faith principle involves a party who dishonestly manipulates its
contracting partner into refraining from pursuing a claim until
the claim is time-barred:
The contract between A and B provides that A must bring suit
against B within two years from the final performance by B if A
wants to make B liable for defects in B's performance. Some time
before the expiration oftms time limit A discovers a serious defect
in B's performance and notifies B that it intends to claim dam
ages. B uses dilatory tactics to put A off. On several occasions it
assures A that A has no reason for concern. B undertakes to look
into the matter, but insists that it will have to investigate it
carefully.
When after the expiration of the two year's time limit, A loses pa
tience and sues B, B invokes the time limit. Not having acted in
good faith, B is estopped from relying on the time limit. 83

The same result would likely be reached ifthe VCC applied
to the contract between A and B, although the VCC good faith
provision would probably not be invoked on these facts. The
doctrine likely to be used if the VCC applied in Illustration 2 is
equitable estoppeL84 Faced with a situation where one party
manipulated the other into sitting on a claim until the time
limit imposed by the statute oflimitations in VCC section 2-725
expired, several courts have held that the breaching party was
equitably estopped from pleading the time-bar. For example, in
City of Bedford v. James Leffel & CO.,85 a buyer of machinery
delayed pursuing a claim in reliance upon the seller's assur
PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt., illus. 2, at 114.
Equitable estoppel is "[a] defensive doctrine preventing one party from tak
ing unfair advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the per
son to be estopped has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the
result that the other person has been injured in some way." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
th
ARY 571 (7
ed. 1999) (sub-entry for "equitable estoppel" under "estoppel").
85 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977).
83
84
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ances that it would find and fix problems with the machinery.
When the seller later failed to correct the defects and the buyer
sued,' the trial court granted the seller summary judgement on
the basis that the four year statute of limitations in DCC sec
tion 2-725 had expired. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that under the equitable estoppel ~octrine
... one cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false
sense of security, and thereby cause his adversary to subject his
claim to the bar ofthe statute, and then be permitted to plead the
very delay caused by his course of conduct as a defense to the ac
tion when brought. 86

Similarly, in L.R. Foy Construction Co. v. Dakota State Ce
ment Plant Commission,87 buyers who failed to receive con
tracted-for cement delayed bringing suit in reliance upon the
seller's representations that it was fairly allocating cement to
its customers. The trial court dismissed the buyers' action as
barred by the statute oflimitations in DCC section 2-725. The
South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doc
trine of equitable estoppel prevented the seller from using the
statute of limitations as a defense. 88
In Foy, the court laid out the requirements of equitable es
toppel as follows: First, there must be false representations or
concealment of materials facts; second, the party that was mis
led must not have known the actual facts; third, the misrepre
sentations must have been made with the intention that they be
acted upon;89 fourth, the party to whom the misrepresentations
were made must have relied on these statements to their detri
ment. 90 These elements appear to be satisfied on the facts of
PECL Illustration 2. Thus, it is likely that a court applying the
86

Id. at 218 (citation omitted).

399 N.W.2d 340 (S.D. 1987).
See id. at 343. Although the VCC does not expressly provide for equitable
estoppel, the court held that the doctrine is applicable to VCC transactions via
VCC § 1-103, which states that "the principles oflaw and equity" supplement the
provisions of the Code unless displaced by particular provisions of the VCC. See
id. at 343, 345.
th
89 In Bedford v. Leffel, the 4 Circuit emphasized that equitable estoppel doc
trine does not require an intentional misrepresentation, so long as the misled
party reasonably relied on inaccurate information supplied by the party to be es
topped. See 558 F.2d at 218.
90 See 399 N.W.2d at 344 (citing Taylor v. Tripp, 330 N.W.2d 542 (S.D.1983)).
87
88
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UCC would reach the same result as a tribunal applying the
good faith provision of the PECL.
Although facts like those in Illustration 2 are unlikely to
invoke the good faith provisions of the UCC, the equitable es
toppel doctrine that would apply under U.S. law is close in
spirit to the good faith approach employed under the PECL. In
fact, the result in the PECL illustration itself is phrased in
terms of estoppel: 'Not having acted in good faith, B is estopped
...."91 Thus the PECL and the UCC approaches to Illustration
2 are very similar indeed. The fact that U.s. law avoids invok
ing the good faith principle in this situation is, nevertheless,
significant. It suggests an inclination to confine the reach of
good faith doctrine, perhaps out of distrust for its potential
power. On the other hand, the willingness ofthe PECL drafters
to use good faith to resolve Illustration 2 evidences support for
an expansive view of the role of the good faith doctrine.

4. Applying Good Faith to Supersede the Parties' Agreement
(PEeL Illustration 3)
Illustration 3 in the comment to the PECL good faith provi
sion is designed to demonstrate that, "[iJn relationships that
last over a period of time (Dauerschuldverhiiltnisse) such as ten
ancies, insurance contracts, agency and distributorship agree
ments, partnerships and employment relationships, the concept
of good faith has particular significance as a guideline for the
parties' behaviour."92 In fact, Illustration 3 demonstrates an
even more fundamental point about the PECL good faith princi
ple: that the drafters contemplate it will be used to overrule ex
press provisions of the parties' agreement, even absent a party's
misleading behavior, reliance on false representations, or simi
lar factors. This dimension of the PECL good faith principle is
also emphasized in the Notes to Article 1:201, where the draft
ers criticize the good faith principle in English law as "a weak
one as it cannot prevail against clear contrary provisions in the
agreement."93 By demonstrating that the good faith obligation
imposed by PECL Article 1:201 can overrule express terms of
the agreement, Illustration 3 reveals a profound gap between
91
92
93

PEeL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt., illus. 2, at 114.
Id. at 114.
Id. art. 1:201, at 118.
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the good faith principle embodied in the PECL and the good
faith doctrine in the UCC (or, indeed, in U.S. law in general).
This gap would produce not just a different approach to facts
like those in the illustration, but most likely a different result.
Illustration 3 states:
In 1945 A, a car manufacturer in country Y, appoints B as its sole
distributor of automobiles for country X. The contract takes effect
on January 1, 1946, and runs for one year. It provides that A,
though not obliged to do so, may give B a one month notice if A
does not wish to renew the contract. On this condition one year
contracts are issued by A and signed by B during the following
years. A does not wish to renew the contract for 1999 and so in
forms B on November 30, 1998. Considering that a contractual
relationship between the parties has lasted for 51 years, B, de
spite the provision on notice in the contract, is entitled to dam
ages because in the circumstances the notice is too short. 94

Nothing in the recited facts of Illustration 3 suggests that A
has in any way represented to B that the 30-day termination
provision would not be invoked, and of course B has not relied
on any such representation. Thus there are no grounds to apply
doctrines of waiver or estoppel. The termination provision ap
pears to have been dutifully included in the written agreement
signed by B each time the contract was renewed, and the facts
do not suggest that A has anything but the most legitimate rea
sons for wishing to terminate the contract. The sole basis for
A's liability is the fact that the contractual relationship with B
has lasted 51 years, leading to the conclusion that the 30 day
notice of termination is "too short." There is no indication of
how long in advance it would be necessary for A to give notice of
termination in order to avoid liability, nor any suggestion of
how A could go about determining this matter now that the ex
press term of the written agreement has become invalid. The
conclusion that 30 days notice is too short is presented without
explanation or justification. Perhaps A has entirely lost the
right to terminate the contract, no matter how much advance
notice is given. Could A have avoided this result by emphasiz
ing, at the time of each annual contract renewal, that it wished
to retain the right to terminate with 30 days notice, and might
94

[d. art. 1:201, emt., illus. 3, at 114.
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well choose to exercise it? Is there some other way for A to pre
serve its right to terminate? Did B have any obligation, at the
time it signed renewal contracts that incorporated the 30-day
termination provision, to inform A that B would not be bound by
the provision, or to suggest to A how much advance notice
would be necessary? The reader of Illustration 3 is not
enlightened.
The conception of the good faith principle suggested by Il
lustration 3 includes the kind of peremptory judicial power to
make or alter the parties' agreement that has traditionally de
terred U.S. law from a whole-hearted embrace of a robust good
faith concept. A comment to PECL Article 1:201 suggests that
the application ofthe good faith principle to override an express
contract term (or even a legal rule) in order to achieve a court's
sense of general justice may be limited by considerations of "cer
tainty and predictability in contractual relationships."95 The
comment, however, is left as a vague and undefined limitation
on the good faith principle with no example given ofthe circum
stances in which it might come into play. At any rate, if the
VCC applied to Illustration 3, the approach and the result
would likely be quite different. Cases decided under the VCC
have repeatedly and clearly held that the obligation of good
faith does not override a contract's express terms.
For example, in Blalock Machinery and Equipment Co. v.
Iowa Manufacturing CO.,96 the plaintiff had been an exclusive
distributor of the defendant's heavy equipment for over 27
years. 97 The distributorship agreement between the parties
contained a clause providing that either party could terminate
the contract with 30 days' written notice. 98 When the defendant
exercised its right of termination pursuant to this clause, the
plaintiff sued, claiming that the defendant's termination was
not in good faith. 99 The court held that the Iowa version of the
VCC, which applied to the dispute, did not prohibit the termi
nation even if it was arbitrary, and that the Code's good faith
95

96
97

98
99

[d. art. 1:201, cmt. G, at 116.
576 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
See id. at 776.

See id.
See id. at 776-77.
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obligation did not override an express term of the contract per
mitting such termination:
The court recognizes that the good faith obligation of the vee has
been adopted by Iowa .... and is applicable to distributorship
contracts, however, the parties have not cited and the court has
not found any cases applying Iowa law that hold that the good
faith obligation overrides the express terms ofthe contract. In the
absence of any authority, the court .... is not persuaded that the
section 1-203 good faith obligation can be used to override or
strike express contract terms. IOO

To similar effect is Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Hon
eywell, Inc.,IOl where the plaintiff had served as a distributor
for Micro Switch, a division of Honeywell, since approximately
1947. 102 In 1977 Micro Switch issued an "Authorized Distribu
tor Policy" that, for the first time, provided Micro Switch and its
distributors the right to terminate the relationship with 30
days' written notice. 103 In 1978, Micro Switch gave notice that
it was terminating the distributorship agreement with the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued. 104 The district court found that
Micro Switch's termination had violated its obligation of good
faith under the UCC and awarded damages,105 but the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that:
The vee good faith provision may not be used to override explicit
contractual terms. Because the record reveals no reason for ig
noring the contract's terms, we hold that where the contract ex
pressly provides for termination on thirty days notice, no good
faith requirement should be implied to override the contractual
provisions. Therefore, the termination was proper within the
terms of the contract. 106

As these cases illustrate, under the UCC (and U.S. law in
general) a long term relationship between the parties is not
grounds for finding that the good faith obligation supersedes an
100 Id. at 777. Blalock relied heavily on Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigera
tion, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
nd
101 771 F.2d 672 (2
Cir. 1985).
102 See id. at 674.
103 See id. at 674-75.
104 See id. at 675.
105 See id. at 675-76.
106 Id. at 679.
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express contractual right to terminate.I° 7 Indeed, U.S. law gen
erally holds that the express terms of a contract prevail over the
good faith obligation. lOB Thus, should a situation like PECL Il
lustration 3 arise under U.S. law, the result would likely differ
from the outcome under the PECL.

5. Good Faith and Reliance, Including Reliance on a Bank's
Mistaken Payment (PEeL Illustration 4)
Illustration 4 in the comment to the PECL general good
faith provision states:
An importer asked its bank to collect on a negotiable instrument.
The bank mistakenly reported to the customer that the money
had been paid, and paid the customer its value. When it was dis
covered that the amount had not been paid, the importer had ir
revocably credited the amount to its foreign business partner.
The bank is estopped from reclaiming the payment. 109

The comment indicates that this illustration exemplifies "a
general principle that a person should not be allowed to set up
the invalidity of an act or another reason for its not being bind
ing upon him when he has induced another person to alter his
position on the faith of the act."110 In other words, "[a] particu
lar application of the principle of good faith and fair dealing is
to prevent a party on whose statement or conduct the other
party has reasonably acted in reliance, from adopting an incon
sistent position."lll
Under the vee, the result in Illustration 4 would depend
on facts not specified. That is because the applicable part of the
vee - Article 4 ("Bank Deposits and Collections") - deals with
107 For other cases holding that an express contractual right to terminate is
not over-ridden by the obligation of good faith, see Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden,
Inc., 666 A.2d 549, 560-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995), reu'd on other grounds 690 A.2d
575 (N.J. 1997) (involving VCC good faith obligation); Triangle Mining Co. v.
Stouffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9 th Cir. 1985) (involving common law good
faith obligation).
th
lOB See, e.g., General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038 (6
Cir. 1990); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1982); Flight
Concepts Ltd. Partnership v. Boeing Co., 819 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Kan. 1993); Frank
Lyon Co. v. Maytag Corp., 715 F. Supp. 922 m.D. Ark. 1989); Highway Equip. Co.
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 707 F. Supp 954 (S.D. Oh. 1989).
109 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt., illus. 4, at 115.
no Id. at 115.
mId. at 114.

326

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[VoL 13:295

such a situation by reference to specific rules rather than by
application of a broad standard like "good faith." The outcome
on the facts of Illustration 4 would likely depend on whether the
"provisional" credit that the bank presumably would have given
its customer (the importer) when he (the importer) deposited
the negotiable instrument for collection had become "final,"112
and whether the bank notified the importer of the non-payment
within the bank's "midnight deadline" or a further "reasonable
time."113 The purposes behind these UCC rules undoubtedly in
clude protecting a bank customer who has reasonably relied on
a bank that is collecting a negotiable instrument - which pre
sumably is also the purpose served by holding the bank liable
under the PECL good faith provision. The significant point,
however, is that U.S. law has chosen to deal with the situation
not by invoking the broad principle of good faith, but instead by
setting up specific rules that define the circumstances in which
a bank customer can reasonably rely on payment for a negotia
ble instrument.
The fact that the analysis of Illustration 4 under the UCC
would not implicate the good faith principle suggests a larger
difference between the approach to good faith in the UCC and
the PECL. U.S. lawyers tend to view the good faith principle as
112 See DeC § 4-214(a) (providing that, when an "item" (which, under DeC § 4
104(a)(9), includes a negotiable instrument) is not honored, a collecting bank that
has given provisional settlement to its customer has a right to "charge back" the
customer's account or obtain a refund, but such rights terminate when settlement
becomes final); DeC § 4-215(a) and (d) (specifYing when settlements for an item
become final). See also DeC § 4-20l(a) (specifYing that a bank that receives an
item is presumed to be an agent for collection purposes rather than the owner of
the item, and that any settlement given by the bank for an item, even if the cus
tomer makes a withdrawal based on the settlement, is presumed to be provisional
until it becomes final under the rules of DeC Article 4). Comment 10 to DeC § 4
215, summarizes the situation as follows: "If previously [a bank] gave to its cus
tomer a provisional credit for the item in an account its receipt of final settlement
for the item 'firms up' this provisional credit and makes it final. When the credit
given by it so becomes final, in the usual case its agency status terminates and it
becomes a debtor to its customer for the amount of the item."
113 See DeC § 4-214(a) (stating that a collecting bank that has not received
final settlement for an item and fails to return the item or give notice to its cus
tomer of the facts by its midnight deadline or a ''longer reasonable time after it
learns the facts" is "liable for any loss resulting from the delay'). As defined in
DeC § 4-104(a)(10), a bank's "midnight deadline" for a negotiable instrument is
"midnight on its next banking day following the banking day OD which it receives
the relevant item ...."
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a last resort, to be invoked only when more specific and focused
doctrines have failed. In other words it is preferable, under
U.S. law, to avoid invoking the general and vague good faith
principle. The PECL, in contrast, appears to view a resolution
based on the good faith principle as preferable to other solu
tions, apparently seeking to expand the good faith umbrella to
encompass as much as possible. Thus, as the comments to the
PECL good faith provision make clear,114 Illustration 4 is in
tended as a specific example of a much broader aspect of the
PECL good faith concept - the protection of those who have rea
sonably relied on a party's words or actions. U.S. law, in con
trast, tends to view reliance-oriented rules (e.g., equitable
estoppel and promissory estoppel) not as a sub-category of good
faith, but as distinct, independent doctrines. It is interesting
that the PECL drafters express the result of applying the good
faith principle to the facts of Illustration 4 in terms of estoppel
("The bank is estopped from reclaiming the payment"), an ap
proach that a U.S. lawyer may well view as a confusing confla
tion of two distinct principles: the principle of protecting
reasonable reliance, and the principle of good faith. Indeed, the
invocation of good faith in connection with an estoppel analysis,
and the idea that protecting reasonable reliance in general is an
aspect ofthe good faith doctrine, call to mind a complaint about
the civil law voiced by a prominent U.S. contracts scholar: "Civil
lawyers demonstrate an unsettling tendency to use the doctrine
of good faith as a cloak with which to envelop other doctrines
. . . . In this fashion, many contract doctrines can be subsumed
under a single amorphous doctrine of good faith."115
Interestingly, in another situation that shares elements of
PECL Illustration 4, the UCC does employ the good faith princi
ple to help protect a party who has relied on mistaken payment
of a negotiable instrument. Under UCC section 3-418, a drawee
who has paid an instrument by mistake may be entitled to resti
See PECL, supra note 1, at 114-15.
Farnsworth, supra note 47, at 60-61. Another possible example of this phe
nomenon involves the rule that damages for losses which the aggrieved party could
have avoided by taking reasonable action are not recoverable (the mitigation of
damages principle). PECL Article 9:505 provides for such a rule. The comments to
Article 1:201, however, indicate the mitigation rule is a specific application of the
general good faith obligation. See PECL supra note 1, art. 1:210, cmt. D, at 115.
114

115
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tution from the payee. ll6 DCC section 3-418(c), however, pro
vides that the drawee cannot claim this remedy against "a
person who took the instrument in good faith and for value or
who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment."
Thus, the DCC employs the good faith principle to determine
the rights of the parties in this situation, although the DCC (in
contrast to the PECL) focuses on the good faith of the party re
ceiving payment rather than the good faith of the payor. Note,
however, that DCC section 3-418(c) provides for a specific good
faith obligation, rather than relying on the general good faith
obligation in DCC section 1-203. This approach suggests that
the drafters lacked confidence that the DCC general good faith
obligation was sufficiently developed and robust to yield the de
sired results in situations covered by that section. This is an
other indication that, compared to the PECL good faith
principle, the general good faith principle in the DCC lacks
vigor.

6.

Good Faith and Post-Contract-Formation Contingencies
(PECL Illustration 5)

Illustration 5 in the comment to the PECL general good
faith provision states:
Constructor C, whose employees have fallen ill in great numbers,
has asked Owner 0 for the time agreed for e's completion of O's
liquor store to be extended by one month. 0 has refused to grant
the extension. Mter that a licence to sell liquor which 0 expected
to get as a routine matter is held up due to a long lasting strike
among civil servants which means that 0 will not be able to use
116 If the drawee's mistake was failure to know that the instrument was sub
ject to a stop payment order or that the drawer's signature was forged, the right to
reclaim the payment is granted by VCC § 3-418(a). For other types of mistakes,
the drawee's reclamation right depends on the general law of mistake and restitu
tion. VCC § 3-418(b).

Note that the situation covered by VCC § 3-418 apparently differs from the
situation in PECL Illustration 4 in that the PECL illustration appears to involve
the restitutionary rights of a bank that is collecting, on behalf of its customer and
as an agent of the customer, a negotiable instrument drawn on another drawee.
DCC § 3-418, in contrast, deals with the restitutionary rights of one that has mis
takenly paid (or accepted) an instrument - i.e., a drawee or the maker of a negotia
ble promissory note. Thus DCC § 3-418 would apparently not apply to the
reclamation rights of a collecting bank that has credited its customer's account for
an uncollected item.
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the building until three months after the agreed completion time.
Good faith requires that 0 notify C that it will not need to have
the building completed on time. See also Article 1:202. 117

A comment explains that the illustration focuses on a con
tracting party's obligation "to show due regard for the interests
of the other party" in the "handling of contingencies which were
not contemplated in their agreement or in the rules of law gov
erning the contract."118
Illustration 5 is not clear on the consequences of the notice
that 0 must give, nor on the result if the notice is not given.
Presumably 0 must permit C the extra month to complete the
building, and 0 will itself be in breach of the good faith obliga
tion unless it comes forward to grant the extension. Thus, as in
Illustration 3 discussed earlier, the good faith principle in Illus
tration 5 is used to overrule express terms of a contract. The
point made in the discussion of Illustration 3 that U.S. law gen
erally forbids using the good faith principle to overrule express
contractual provisions 1l9 is therefore also relevant here.
There are, of course, certain U.S. doctrines that overcome
express contractual provisions. One that focuses on the effect of
post-contract-formation contingencies and that might be rele
vant in Illustration 5 is the doctrine of impracticability, which
(according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts) excuses a
party's non-performance of contractual duties if the perform
ance was made "impracticable" by "the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made."120 Whether the impracticability doc
trine would apply in Illustration 5 if C failed to complete the
liquor store on time would depend on facts not specified, such as
whether C assumed the risk of his employees' illness (which
might, in turn, depend on the foreseeability at the time the con
117 PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:201, cmt., illus. 5, at 115. PECL Article 1:202,
referred to at the end of Illustration 5, provides that "Each party owes to the other
a duty to co-operate in order to give full effect to the contract."

Because Illustration 5 involves a building construction contract, it would be
outside the scope of the VCC. For this reason my discussion of Illustration 5 under
V.S. law will focus on the common law of contracts.
118 ld. art. 1:201, cmt. D, at 115 ("Mutual consideration").
119 See supra text accompanying notes 95-108.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CaNTS. § 261 (1981). For contracts for the sale
of goods, VCC § 2-615 states a very similar rule.
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tract was formed that the employees would fall ill) and the abil
ity of C to overcome the problem (e.g., overtime or hiring
temporary replacements). The PECL contains doctrines with a
similar thrust in Article 8:108 ("Excuse Due to an Impedi
ment")121 and Article 6:111 ("Change of Circumstances").122
The fact that the PECL drafters did not raise the possibility of
C claiming excuse under Article 8:108 or hardship under Article
6: 111 on the facts of Illustration 5 implies that the illness of C's
employees would not trigger relief under those provisions. This,
in turn, suggests that excuse under U.S. law for impracticabil
ity is also unlikely.
PECL Articles 8:108 and 6:111, as well as the U.S. imprac
ticability doctrine, would focus primarily, if not exclusively, on
C's situation and the effect that the employees' illness would
have on C's ability to perform. The fact that O's delay in acquir
ing the liquor license means that C's late performance would
not harm 0, does not appear relevant to the question of whether
C has suffered an excusing impediment under PECL Article
8:108 or a hardship under PECL Article 6:111. That, presuma
bly, is why the PECL drafters invoked the good faith doctrine on
these facts. Thus the key fact for applying the PECL good faith
principle in Illustration 5 is the lack of harm that 0 would suf
fer from C's delayed completion of the building. The fact that
C's late performance would have only trivial consequences for 0
also does not appear relevant to the impracticability analysis
under U.S. law. The focus of section 261 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the comments to that section are on
PECL Article 8:108(1) provides:
A party's non-performance is excused if it proves that it is due to an im
pediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably have been
expected to take the impediment into account at the time ofthe conclusion
of the contract or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or its
consequences.
122 The hardship doctrine of Article 6:111 applies if "performance of the con
tract becomes excessively onerous because of a change of circumstances," provided
that certain other specified requirements (including a requirement that the parties
could not reasonably have taken the possibility of the change into account when
the contract was formed) are met, PECL, supra note 1, art. 6:111(2). When it
applies, the PECL hardship provision requires the parties to begin negotiations to
"adapt" (Le., modify) the contract to the changed circumstances. If the negotia
tions fail, a court can either terminate the agreement or "adapt the contract in
order to distribute between the parties in a just and equitable manner the losses
and gains resulting from the change of circumstances." Id. at art. 6:111(3).
121
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the difficulty that the party claiming excuse faces in perform
ing, and the risks that such party undertook when it entered
into the contract.
Assuming that, under U.S. law, the illness of its employees
would not originally have permitted C to claim the impractica
bility excuse for non-performance, the conclusion would likely
remain the same despite the further developments that ren
dered C's late performance harmless to O. Nor is it likely that
U.S. law would permit the good faith principle to overrule an
express contract provision setting the date for C to complete
performance. Instead, U.S. law would probably deal with the
trivial harm that C's late performance caused 0 through reme
dies rules rather than the good faith principle.
Thus, if C was late in completing the building and 0 sued
for breach (assuming, again, that C could not claim excuse for
the breach under the impracticability doctrine), C's defective
performance would almost certainly be treated as an immate
rial breach of contract that would not discharge 0 from its du
ties under the contract. 123 As a result, 0 would have to pay Cat
the contract rate, subject only to an offset for the damages 0
suffered because of C's tardiness. Since 0 has suffered no losses
from the delay, the damages would be nominal. As a result, C
would receive full payment despite its late performance. Thus,
under U.S. law Illustration 5 is likely to be treated like the situ
ation in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,124 a celebrated U.S. con
tract case in which Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of
123 Several of the factors identified in § 241 of the Restatement (Second) of Con
tracts as relevant in determining if a breach is material strongly suggest that late
performance by C would not be deemed a material breach. The first (and most
important) consideration identified by the Restatement is "the extent to which the
injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected," RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 241(a) (1981). Because of the delay in acquiring
the liquor license, C's late completion of the building would cause 0 to lose very
little of the benefit it expected from the contract. It also appears that 0 could be
adequately compensated in damages for any loss it would suffer, see id. § 241(b),
and that C (who would have performed, albeit late) would suffer a considerable
forfeiture if the breach were treated as material, see id. § 241(c). Finally, because
C's delayed performance was forced on it by its employees' illness, its behavior
appears to comport with "standards of good faith and fair dealing," see id. at
§ 241(e). Note that this final factor incorporates a good faith inquiry into the anal
ysis of Illustration 5 under U.s. law, although (unlike under the PECL) it is the
good faith of C rather than 0 that is the issue.
124 129 N.E. 889 (NY 1921).
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Appeals found that a building contractor's technical breach,
which caused the landowner no provable damages, did not ex
cuse the landowner from paying the full balance due under the
contract. This outcome approximates the result under the
PECL of requiring 0, as a matter of good faith, to waive the
contract delivery date.
Of course, there are important differences between the ap
proaches to Illustration 5 under the PECL and U.S. law. U.S.
law would probably treat the situation as involving a breach for
which no remedy is necessary. Under the PECL, presumably,
late completion by C would not be a breach at all. Because of
the remedy provisions of the PECL, this difference (breach
without a remedy vs. no breach) might be significant. Influ
enced by the civil law tradition, specific performance is more
readily available under the PECL than under U.S. law. 125 Thus
under the PECL, if the original contractual completion date re
mained valid there is a greater chance that 0 could obtain a
court order requiring C to complete performance by that date.
Because ofthe operation ofthe PECL good faith provision, how
ever, 0 presumably could not obtain specific performance since
timely completion is no longer legally required. Under U.S. law
it is less critical to fmd that the contract is modified to extend
the deadline for C's performance because it is less likely that 0
could obtain an order requiring C to complete within the time
required by the contract. O's remedy at law (damages) does not
appear to be inadequate - indeed, even $0 damages appears ad
equate to compensate 0 for C's delay. Thus 0 fails to satisfy
one of the tradition prerequisites for specific performance under
125 Whereas U.S. law treats specific performance as an exceptional remedy
available only in special circumstances, PECL art. 9:102(1) makes the availability
of specific performance the general rule, subject to exceptions in Article 9:102(2).
The exceptions, it is true, are significant, and might prevent specific performance
from being ordered in Illustration 5. For example, PECL art. 9:102(2)(b) states
that specific performance is not available where "performance would cause the
debtor unreasonable effort or expense," which might well apply to C's situation.
Despite the important limitations on specific performance in PECL Article
9:102(2), it remains true that the remedy is probably more readily available under
the PECL than under U.S. law. As the comment to the PECL specific performance
provision indicates, the PECL rule was designed as "a compromise" between the
treatment of the remedy in common law systems (where it is viewed as "excep
tional") and in civil law systems (where the remedy is seen as an "ordinary" one).
See PECL, supra note 1, art. 9:102, cmt. B, at 395. ("The principle and exceptions").
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U.S. law.I 26 Even if this hurdle were overcome, under U.S. law,
specific performance is an equitable remedy within the discre
tion of the court, and the facts of Illustration 5 strongly suggest
equitable reasons for a court to deny the remedy to 0.127
There are other significant differences between the ap
proaches of the PEeL and U.S. law to Illustration 5. For exam
ple, the contract might have specified that late completion must
be treated as a material breach or a "fundamental non-perform
ance"128 relieving 0 of its obligation to pay at the contract rate
(i.e., a "time ofthe essence" clause), or, it might have included a
liquidated damages clause specifying reductions in the price for
each day that completion of the building is delayed. Although
U.S. courts have shown themselves adept at getting around
such provisions when they are convinced that delay in fact has
not harmed the aggrieved party,129 the U.S. approach of treat
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 359 (1981).
For example, according to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, specific
performance should be denied when "the relief would cause unreasonable hardship
or loss to the party in breach ....," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 364(1)(b)
(1981). The comment to this provision suggests it applies to situations involving
"elements of impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose that fall
short of what is required for relief under those doctrines," Id. at cmt. a. The illus
tration of this principle given in the comment resembles PECL Illustration 5 in a
general way:
A, a milkman, and B, a dairy farmer, make a contract under which B is to
sell and A to buy all of A's requirements of milk, but not less than 200
quarts a day, for one year. B may deliver milk from any source but ex
pects to deliver milk from his own herd. B's herd is destroyed because of
hoof and mouth disease and he fails to deliver any milk. A sues B for
specific performance. Even though B's duty to deliver milk is not dis
charged and B is liable to A for breach of contract, specific performance
may properly be refused on the ground of unfairness.
Id. at illus. 4. Like PECL Illustration 5, the Restatement illustration involves a
perfectly valid contract that has become difficult to perform because of post-con
tract developments that are not sufficient to excuse performance. And like PECL
Illustration 5, the ''balance of hardships" between the parties to the Restatement
illustration swings strongly against awarding specific performance.
128 See PECL, supra note 1, arts. 8:103, 9:301 (defining "fundamental non-per
formance" and its consequences).
129 See, e.g., Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Developments, 776 P.2d
977,982 (Wash. App. 1989) ("While there is some authority that an otherwise valid
liquidated damages clause is enforceable even if there are no actual damages, the
weight of authority and the better-reasoned cases hold that where there is no ac
tual loss, an otherwise enforceable liquidated damages clause is not enforceable
because to do so would violate the principle that damages should be compensatory
only.").
126

127
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ing C's delay as a breach and sorting out its trivial effect on 0 in
the remedy makes it difficult to deal with such provisions.
Under the PECL approach, however, these provisions would
probably not come into play because, as a result of the good
faith doctrine, the contract presumably does not require C to
complete by the scheduled date.
Another difference between the PECL approach and that in
U.S. law is that, under U.S. law, C may not become aware that
acquisition ofthe liquor license has been delayed, and thus com
pletion of the building on time is no longer important to O. Be
lieving incorrectly that 0 would suffer significant losses from
late completion (and C would become liable for significant dam
ages), C might incur substantial additional expenses attempt
ing to finish the building on time. The PECL approach has the
advantage of mandating that 0 notify C that completion of the
building by the scheduled date is no longer required, so that
such economically-wasteful expenditures by C would be
avoided. Under the U.S. approach, however, O's self-interest
might well lead to a resolution that avoids wasteful expendi
tures by C. The delay in receiving the liquor license presents 0
with the opportunity to bargain with C for an extension to com
plete the building. 0 might agree to such an extension in ex
change for a reduction in the price (the amount of the reduction
would be determined by the parties' bargaining skills). If the
parties reached such a bargain, then C would not engage in eco
nomically-wasteful steps to complete by the original contract
date. Under this approach, 0 gets an advantage (a reduced
price) compared to the situation under the PECL, where the
good faith doctrine compels 0 to extend the completion date
without receiving anything in return. It is not clear, however,
that the distributional differences between the PECL approach
and the U.S. approach favor one over the other. In particular, it
is not clear whether it is better that C, which has been put into
a difficult spot by its employees' illnesses, should receive an ex
tension of time for "free" (note that C's difficulties in performing
do not rise to a level allowing it to claim excuse from performing
the contract), or whether 0, who may be suffering significant
losses caused by the delay in receiving the liquor license, should
receive some compensation for the extension.
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The major disadvantage of the PECL approach is lack of
certainty. The facts of Illustration 5 permit a clear-cut applica
tion of the good faith principle because they have clarity and
simplicity only possible in hypotheticals. In reality, the delay in
receiving the liquor license might not totally eliminate the
losses a would incur or the lost opportunities it would suffer if
C completes the building late. For example, a might have en
tered into contracts with landscapers, fIxture installers and dec
orators which may be lost or which may require delay payments
if the building is not completed and available as scheduled. A
might be able to use the "extra" time between scheduled com
pletion of the building and receipt of the liquor license to better
design and adapt the space for business purposes. How much
loss and disadvantage does good faith require a to incur in
granting C an extension? Trying to predict how a tribunal
would react if the delayed liquor license reduced but did not
completely eliminate a's losses would be extremely diffIcult for
0, who after all is himself an innocent victim of circumstances
beyond his control. Or suppose (as would likely be the case in
the "real world") that it is not completely certain that the strike
among civil servants will delay the license three months. How
probable must the delay be before a's good faith duty to grant C
an extension arises? Suppose the strike unexpectedly settles,
and there is no delay (or a much shorter delay than expected) in
receiving the liquor license. Does good faith demand that C now
reinstate the original due date, or at least compensate a for the
losses it will now suffer from delay? The PECL approach raises
these very diffIcult questions and many more, and requires a to
predict accurately how a tribunal will resolve them on pain of
himself being in breach of its obligations. 13o
The flexibility needed to deal with uncertainty and mixed
facts highlights the advantages of a negotiated resolution
(which the U.S. approach to Illustration 5 arguably encourages)
rather than an imposed solution like that posited under the
PECL good faith doctrine in Illustration 5. Of course, the un
certainty that both a and C would face under the PECL ap
130 Comment G to the PECL good faith provision recognizes this problem when
it suggests that the technique of using the good faith principle to override an ex
press contract term may have to yield to considerations of "certainty and predict
ability in contractual relationships," PECL art. 1:201, supra note 1, cmt. G, at 116.
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proach if the facts of Illustration 5 were more realistic might
well impel the parties to reach a negotiated solution, but the
bargaining would be made difficult by the uncertainty arising
from the PECL approach. The advantages of the PECL ap
proach over the U.s. solution, furthermore, are difficult to see if
both lead to the same result.
IV.

CONCLUSION

On the surface, the general good faith provisions of the
PECL and the UCC appear similar. Each imposes a direct good
faith obligation on the parties to a contract, and each does so in
language that is substantially (although certainly not com
pletely) equivalent. Examination of the good faith principle in
action, as applied to specific fact scenarios, reveals a more com
plicated picture. Sometimes the PECL and the UCC general
good faith provisions operate in substantially identical fashion,
as in the case of a "pretextual" rejection of goods for minor de
fects. l3l Sometimes the result of applying the PECL good faith
principle is reproduced under U.S. law without invoking the
good faith doctrine, such as where a party is lured into neglect
ing a deadline for asserting legal rights l32 or where changed cir
cumstances would cause a party's late performance to have only
trivial consequences for the other side. l33 And in some cases,
U.S. law reaches results that differ from those obtained under
the PECL good faith principle, as in some contract formation
scenariosl 34 and situations that involve the continuing validity
of express contract terms in long term relationships.l35 It is
clear that the civil law approach to the contractual obligation of
good faith has strongly influenced both the UCC and PECL Ar
ticle 1:201. This influence produces some significant similari
ties between the good faith obligations imposed by the UCC and
the PECL. However, the traditional common law distrust of the
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implied obligation of good faith and the continuing preference in
V.S. legal practice for more narrowly-tailored doctrines produce
substantial differences in the theory and application of the good
faith principle under the PECL and the VCC.

